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ARBrrRATION AND AwARD-EVIDENCE-CORT M AY NOT ORDEn DErosi-
TION AND DiscovERY BEFORE SUBMISSION OF ISu.S.--An arbitration had
been ordered by the court. Before the submission, one of the parties ap-
plied to the court for an order directing the other to appear for an ex-
amination and to disclose its books. Held, that the petition be denied,
since, under the New York Arbitration Law, a court cannot order a
statutory deposition to be taken before trial of the issues by the arbi-
trators. In re Schwartz, 127 Misc. 452, 217 N. Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct.
1925).
In New York, before trial of an action, any party thereto may cause a
deposition to be taken or a bill of discovery to be issued for certain testi-
mony. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1924) § 288; Klapp v. M11crIn, 122 Misc.
708, 203 N. Y. Supp. 694 (Sup. Ct. 1924). A statute provides that "arbitra-
tion of a controversy under a contract or submission . . . shall b deemed
a special proceeding. . ." N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill's 1923) c. 31l, § G-a.
Another statute provides that testimony may be taken by deposition in a
special proceeding or for use in such a proceeding about to be brought, as
though the proceeding were an action. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1924) § '08;
ef. People v. Fowler, 107 Misc. 253, 176 N. Y. Supp. 806 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
Hence as a matter of statutory interpretation, any party to an arbitration
under the New York Act ought to be able to obtain a court order for deposi-
tion before or during trial of the issues. Intcroccan Mcreantike Corp. V.
Buell, 207 App. Div. 164, 201 N. Y. Supp. 753 (1st Dept. 1923). MIoreover, it
would seem that the court could adequately order a statement of the neces-
sary issues from the demandant, there being no statutory bar thereto. But
cf. Smyth v. Board of Edzcation, 217 N. Y. Supp. 231 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
The instant decision holds, in effect, that by agreeing to arbitrate, partic.
thereby forfeit the use of expedient methods of obtaining evidence. The
danger that arbitration would be hindered by such "procedural technicali-
ties" seems slight since the arbitrators have a wide discretion in using
any evidence which may be obtained. Cf. Everett v. Bro n, 120 Misc.
349, 198 N. Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
ARBITRATION AND AWARD-WHAT CONSTIT'rIES A CONTROVERSY UNDER
Nuw YORK ARBITRATION LAW.-The plaintiff sold foxes to the defendant,
-who gave notes for part of the purchase price. The written contract of
sale provided "that should any unreconcilable dispute arise in connection
with this purchase and sale," it should be arbitrated. The defendant
refused to pay or arbitrate, claiming a set-off arising out of a second
contract for the care of the foxes, which contained a similar arbitra-
tion provision. The plaintiff petitioned the court under § 3 of the
Arbitration Law to order arbitration. The order was refused in the
lower court. Held, on appeal, (two judges dissctiing) that the ruling
be affirmed since there was no "controversy" within the Arbitration Law
under the first contract, for the defendant admitted his responsibility
thereunder and merely refused to pay. Webster v. Van All", 210 N. Y.
Supp. 552 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 1926).
A refusal to pay the agreed purchase price for any reason whatever
should present a "dispute . . . in connection with this purchase and
sale." Assuming with the court that the counterclaim arises out of a
separate contract, the counterclaim would be outside of the arbitratoro'
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jurisdiction. Webb v. Parker, 130 App. Div. 92, 114 N. Y. Supp. 489 (1st
Dept. 1909); Busse v. Agnew, 10 ,Ill. App. 527 (1882); of. (1926) 35
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 369. In the absence of statute, an award such as
was requested in the instant case would not have been final. Assumpsit
could have been brought on the award. Whitcher v. Whitcher, 49 N. H.
176 (1870). In such action the defendant could avail himself of counter-
claims arising under the second contract. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1924)
§ 266 (2); of. Job & Co. v. Sanders, 121 Misc. 760, 202 N. Y. Supp. 752
(Sup. Ct. 1923). But, by statute in New York, a judgment and execu-
tion issues upon the award on motion to the court. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act
(1924) §§ 1456, 1461, 11463. This motion is open to attack only upon
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, of evident miscalculation of figures, of
imperfection in form, or of fraud upon the part of the arbitrators. N. Y.
Civ. Prac. Act (1924), §§ 1456, 1457, 1458; Everett v. Brown, 120 Misc.
349, 198 N. Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Matter of Goff & Sons, 199
App. Div. 617, 192 N. Y. Supp. 92 (1st Dept. 1922). Apparently, there-
fore, an arbitration and award would be conclusive as to whether the
defendant should pay the notes. The court, in the instant case, said
that the plaintiff should not be allowed to gain a tactical advantage by
securing arbitration on the first contract without asking for it on the second,
But since the defendant can obtain arbitration of the second contract,
the plaintiff gains no such advantage.
BANKRUPTCY-PRIORITIES OF LIENS OVER TAxES.-Mechanic lienors peti-
tioned the court for an order directing the trustee in bankruptcy to give
their liens priority over United States income tax claims. Section 64-a
of the Bankruptcy Act [U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 9648-a] directs that
taxes be paid "in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors."
Section 67-d [U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 9651-d] provides that liens
given for a present consideration and not in fraud upon the bankruptcy
law shall "not be affected by this act." Held, that the order be granted,
since the priority given by section 64-a affects only unsecured claims and
does not displace subsisting liens within section 67-d. In re Caswell Const.
Co., 13 Fed. (2d) 667 (N. D. N. Y. 1926).
Section 67-d of the Act is ambiguous in that its language is broad
enough to cover the whole Act, but its position would make it appear
to qualify only sectioh 67-c which voids certain liens. The Supreme Court,
however, has held that it applies to the whole 'Act. Richmond V. Bird,
249 U. S. 174, 39 Sup. Ct. 186 (1919). The instant decision in sub-
ordinating tax claims to mechanics' liens is in accord with the legislative
policy of preferring private creditors. See a recent amendment to the
Act giving wage claims priority over tax claims. U. S. Comp. Stat,
(Supp. 1926) § 9648.
BANKS AND BANKING-JOINT DEPOSITS-RIGHT OF SURVIVOR.-Plaintiff's
intestate opened a joint savings account in the name of his sister and him-
self, giving both the privilege of withdrawal, but reserving to himself the
power of revocation. He died without having exercised this power. In
letters to his sister he stated his desire that the balance be paid to her in
case she survived him. In an action to prevent the bank from paying her,
the lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that thejudgment be reversed on the ground that a joint interest was created at
the time the account was opened. Cleveland Tnust Co. v. Scobie, 151 N. E.
373 (Ohio, 1926).
Joint deposits without the power of revocation have been held to pass
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to the survivor on various legalistic theories. Booth ,. Oakland Say.
Bank, 122 Calif. 19, 54 Pac. 370 (1898) (trust) ; Kelly v. Bccro, 19. N. y.
49, 86 N. E. 980 (1909) (gift); Erzi, v. Flter, 283 Ill. UN, 119 N. E.
926 (1918) (joint tenancy); Brecr v. Boz,.crso;,, 92 Md. 567, 43 Atl. 1060
(1901) (estate by the entireties); Dcal's Adn'r -,v. crchents & Mcch. Say.
Bank, 120 Va. 297, 91 S. E. 135 (1917) (contract); Chippendale v. North
Adams Say. Bank, 222 Blass. 499, 111 N. E. 371 (191G) (novation). Con-
tra: Swan v. Walden, 156 Calif. 195, 103 Pae. 931 (1909) (disapproving
estate by the entireties); Norway v. Mcrriam, 8 Me. 146, 33 Atl. 840
(1895) (held to be a testamentary document void because of the Statute
of Wills). The instant case does not fit any of the orthodox theorics.
The presence of the power of revocation would not be fatal to a trust.
Robb v. Washington and Jefferson College, 185 N. Y. 4S5, 'S N. E. 359
(1906). In the instant case, however, the facts from which the court can
deduce an "intention" to create a trust are lacking. There was no express
declaration of trust nor any unequivocal act evidencing desire to create
one accompanying the making of the deposit. Cf. N"ichlaz -e. Parl:cr, 71
N. J. Eq. 777, 61 Atl. 267 (1905); Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71
N. E. 748 (1904) (doctrine of tentative trusts); (1920) 'JO Y,= LAW
JOURNAL, 96. The power of revocation precludes a gift. Dcnigan t.
Hibernia Say. Soo., 127 Calif. 139, 59 Pac. 3S9 (1899). Likewise, a joint
tenancy. Staples v. Berry, 110 Mle. 32, 85 At. 303 (1912). The entire-
ties apply only to husband and wife. Cf. Brcwcr v. Bowcrso, -zpra. The
contract theory requires consideration. See Denigan v. San Fran. Unfon,
supra, at 150, 59 Pac. at 392. There seems to be a tendency, however, to
be liberal in the application of the legalistic theory used. HobolTcn BankI.
v. Schwoon, 62 N. J. Eq. 503, 50 Atl. 490 (1901) (unequivocal declaration
of trust held unnecessary); Negaznnee Nat. Bank v. Le Bcau, 195 Iich.
502, 161 N. W. 974 (1917) (delivery of pass book not essential for a
gift). These theories are used to arrive at conclusions consonant with
the intention of the parties. The instant decision on its facts seems to
carry out the obvious contemplation of the parties. Many states have
statutes protecting banks which have paid balances to the surviving joint
depositor. E.g. Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 167, § 14; (1923) 9. Conu.
L. Q. 48. Similar legislation to fix the rights of survivors in accordance
with the intention of the depositors seems desirable. E.g. N. Y. Cons.
Laws (Cahill's, 1923) § 249.
BANKs AD BANKING-TIME FOR PRssrN-raiMNT OF "0:; An nAV"
DRAFr.-The defendant flour company shipped flour to a Bridgeport dealer
and drew a draft "payable thirty days after arrival." The draft with a
bill of lading attached was sent for collection to the defendant bank, with
instructions to "surrender documents upon drawee's acceptance of draft."
Before arrival of the flour the drawee accepted the draft, and the bank, in
accordance with a local banking custom, treated acceptance as "arrival,"
dated the draft accordingly, and surrendered the bill of lading. There-
upon, the drawee pledged the bill on a loan from the bank. A fey: days
later the drawee became insolvent. Before demand for the flour by the
bank, the flour company notified the plaintiff railroad to stop delivery
The latter brought a bill of interpleader to determine title to the flour.
The trial court held that the custom of Bridgeport banks was inconsisztent
with instructions, and gave judgment for the flour company. Held, on ap-
peal, that the judgment be reversed. New AvYrk, N. H. & H. R. R. v. F vzt
Nat. Bank of Bridgeport, Conn., 134 At. 223 (Conn. 1926).
If a bank having an item for collection fails to follow the inctructions
of its principal, it becomes responsible for resulting loss. Collin County
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Nat. Bank v. Turner, 167 S. W. 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914). In th.,
absence of instructions, a bank has certain well-defined duties. It must
present paper for acceptance where necessary to charge drawers or in-
dorsers. Citizen's Bank v. Third Nat. Bank, 19 Ind. App. 69, 49 N. E.
171 (1898); N. I. L. § 143. Even where not thus required under the
N. I. L., a bank must present promptly to protect its principal, and give
notice if there is refusal of acceptance. Exchange Nat. Bank V. Third
Nat. Bank, 112 U. S. 276, 5 Sup. Ct. 141 (1884). Upon acceptance of a
time or sight draft (of more than three days) in absence of instructions,
a bank should surrender the attached bill of lading. National Bank v.
Merchants' Bank, 1 Otto, 92 (U. S. 1875); Porter Law of Bills of Lading
(1891) 400 et seq. But only upon payment, if the draft is on demand or
under four days. N. B. L. Act. § 41. Where there is neither instruction
nor established law a bank may sometimes rely on custom. Sahlien v.
Bank, 90 Tenn. 221 (1891) (custom to hold dishonored paper 10 days
without giving notice); Bank of Washington v. Triplett & Neale, 1 Pet.
25 (U. S. 1828). But it has been held that a particular custom will not
excuse unless known to the principal. Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy,
264 U. S. 160, 44 Sup. Ct. 296 (1924). And even if known, the
agent may still assume the risk of being held responsible. See Federal
Reserve Bank v. Malloy, supra at 170, 44 Sup. Ct. at 299. There
seems to be no case of premature presentment for acceptance. Premature
payment to a 'collecting bank, however, has been held to discharge a
drawee. Bliss v. Cutter, 19 Barb. 9 (N. Y. 1854) (dictum that bank is
not responsible). The instant case seems to be the first raising the queg-
tion of when "on arrival" drafts should be presented. The court inter-
preted the action of the bank as consistent with the instructions. If the
instruction had been "to surrender upon acceptance on arrival," the court
might have treated it as authorizing surrender only on arrival. The case,
therefore, leaves undecided whether an "on arrival" draft may be pre-
sented before the arrival of the goods. Hence, a bank that follows a
custom of presenting "on arrival" drafts immediately for acceptance as-
sumes the risk of having the custom declared contrary to instructions.
BILLS AND NOTES--CANCELLATION OF NOTATION OF PAYMENT ON BAOK OF
NOTE NOT ALTERATION OF "INSTRUENT!--The plaintiff was the holder of
two promissory notes made by the defendant. Note A was secured by a
mortgage and contained an indorsement by the plaintiff of a partial pay-
ment of $500. Note B was not so well secured. The plaintiff drew a pencil
line through the notation of payment on note A and credited the amount
on note B. In an action to foreclose the mortgage securing note A, the
lower court found for the plaintiff crediting the defendant with the par-
tial payment. The defendant appealed on the ground that the instrument
had been materially altered and was, therefore, avoided. Held, that the
judgment be affirmed. Harrington v. Leighton, 208 N. W. 219 (S. D.
1926).
Section 124 of the N. I. L. provides that where a negotiable instrument
has been materially altered, it is avoided except as against a holder in
due course. When an instrument is avoided depends upon what meaning
is put into the variable term "instrument. ' Additions to and erasures
from the principal wording on the face of a note have been held to be
alterations of the "instrument." Builders Lime & Cement Co. V. Weimer,
170 Iowa, 444, 151 N. .W. 100 (1915) ;' ("order of" stricken out and "or
bearer" inserted); Draper v. Wood, 112 Mass. 315 (1873) (adding in-
terest provision). Also, conditions attached to the face of a note by glue
or 'perforation. Bothwell v. Schweitzer, 84 Neb. 271, 120 N. W. 1129
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(1909); Heldman v. Gz'nell, 201 Ill. App. 172 (1916). But courts have
held marginal notations used as reference memoranda not to be part of the
"instrument." Eaton v. Daley, 32 N. D. 328, 155 N. W. 644 (1915);
Clem v. Chapman, 262 S. W. 168 (1924) (extending due date). There is
less uniformity in the decisions as to whether indorsements are part of
the "instrument." "Material" changes of the nature of an indorsement
have been held to discharge the indorser. Sawyer State Bank; v. Suther-
land, 36 N. D. 493, 162 N. W. 696 (1917) (writing "protest waived"
above blank indorsement) ; Waltham State Bank v'. Tuttle, 160 Minn. 250,
199 N. W. 970 (1924) (erasure of "without recourse" and substitution of
"demand and protest waived"). But not to be a defense to a maker.
Continental Bank v. Sacks, 152 La. 98, 92 So. 747 (1922). It seems, then,
that so far as the maker is concerned, the "instrument" is his original
agreement. Thus, notations on the back of promissory notes have been
held "independent collateral" agreements. Cambridge Saving Bank v.
Hyde, 131 Mass. 77 (1881) (notation that interest was to be reduced));
Hakes v. Russ, 175 Fed. 751 (C. C. A. 6th, 1910) ; Bland v. Fidelity Trz,.ut
Co., 71 Fla. 499, 71 So. 630 (1916) (addition of notation of payment-under
N. I. L.). Likewise, prior to the N. I. L., the erasure of such indorsements
was held not to be a material alteration of the "instrument." Sims4 v. Pa.-
chal, 27 N. C. 276 (1844); Theopold v. Deike, 76 Minn. 121, 73 N. W. 977
(1899). The instant decision would seem to be a commercially satisfactory
limitation to the drastic penalty, in many cases, of complete avoidance
imposed by section 124.
CAREIERS-AGREEmENT TO ExEisaT ONE JOINT Torr-FE&son BEForx
CAUSE OF ACTION HAS ACCRUED HELD A RELEASE OF BoTn.The defendant
railway company issued to the plaintiff a gratuitous pass, the latter assunt-
ing all risks of personal harm. The plaintiff entered the terminal to boar.I
a train, and was injured by falling on a slippery floor. In an action for
damages, the defendant terminal company successfully pleaded the agree-
ment with the defendant railway company as a bar to the action. Held,
on appeal, (one judge dissenting) that the judgment be affirmed, since
the agreement operated as a release of both defendants. Wilder v. Penn-
sylvania Ry. Co., 217 N. Y. Supp. 56 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1926).
A carrier is responsible to a passenger for hire for negligent injury,
regardless of an agreement to the contrary. Buckley v. Bangor, etc. R. R.,
113 Me. 164, 93 Atl. 65 (1915). It is otherwise where the passenger is
given a gratuitous pass. Quimby v,. Boston & Maine R. R., 150 Mass. 365,
23 N. E. 205 (1890); Charleston, etc. Ry. v. Thonpson, 234 U. S. 576, 34
Sup. Ct. 964 (1913). Contra: Huckstcp v. St. Louis & H. Ry., 166 Mo.
App. 330, 148 S. W. 988 (1912); ef. New York Cent. R. R. v. Mahoncy,
252 U. S. 152, 40 Sup. Ct. 287 (1920) (recovery was allowed where rail-
way was guilty of "gross" negligence); 9 A. L. R. 496, note. A release
of one tort-feasor after the cause of action has accrued operates to release
all. Snyder v. Telephone Co., 135 Iowa, 215, 112 N. W. 776 (1907). The
reason given is that since there is but a single injury there can be but
one satisfaction; that the release implies satisfaction, and hence another
suit is repugnant thereto. Abb v. Northern Pac. Ry., 23 Wash. 428, CS
Pac. 954 (1902). The extreme technicality of this rule has been criticised.
(1921) 21 COL. L. Rnv. 491; (1923) 10 VA. L. REV. 70. The tendency of
the courts is to be liberal to the releasor. Some courts are astute in find-
ing the joint tort relationship not to exist. Wiest v. Traction Co., 200
Pa. 148, 49 Atl. 891 (1901). The Koursk, 40 T. L. R. 399 (C. A. 1924);
(1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 891; (1924) 34 YaLn LAW JOu NAL, 335. The
most common evasion of the rule, however, lies in construing the agreement
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to exempt from responsibility as a covenant not to sue rather than a
technical release. Kr'opidlowski v. Pfister, etc. Co., 149 Wis. 421, 135 N. W.
839 (1912). Especially where there is a reservation in the release evi-
dencing an intention to hold all other tort-feasors. Dwy v. Conn. Go.,
89 Conn. 74, 92 Atl. 883 (1915); Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith, 100
Ohio 348, 126 N. E. 300 (1919). But no such reservation should be neces-
sary. Cf. Warner v. Brill, 195 App. Div. 64, 185 N. Y. Supp. 586 (3rd Dept.
1921). Particularly where, as in the instant case, the agreement is made
before any right of action has arisen, since it is not likely that a party,
in exempting a railway company from responsibility for possible future
negligence, would contemplate an exemption of all others whose negli-
gence might concur to produce injury.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ORE EXTRACTED FROii INDIAN LAND NOT TAXABLE
BY STATE.-Plaintiff sued to recover tax money paid under protest to the
State of Oklahoma. The levy in question was an ad valorem tax on ores
taken from a federal Indian reservation under a lease to the plaintiff
which provided for payment of royalties directly to the Secretary of the
Interior for the Indians. The Oklahoma Supreme Court gave judgment
for the State. Held, on writ of error, (Justices Brandeis and MlcReynolds
dissenting) that the judgment be reversed since this was a tax on an
agency of the government. Two considerations were advanced, in the
dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis: (1) the ore became private personal
property on severance from the ground, (2) there is a distinction between
a state tax restricting the power of a federal instrument to serve the gov-
ernment and a tax upon its property. Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 46 Sup.
Ct. 592 (1926).
The distinction between taxation of the operation.of a federal "instru-
ment" and taxation of its property although previously recognized was not
followed in a recent decision. Clallam County v. United States Spruce
Corp., 263 U. S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 121 (1923). But this distinction scorns
justified where the property sought to be taxed is used primarily to earn
profit for a private corporation and not for the governmental purposes of
the United States. Cohen and Dayton, Federal and State Taxation (1925)
34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 807. The exemption of a federal instrument from
state taxation should be justified only when the functioning of the instru-
ment is obstructed. Thus, by way of analogy, state taxes on foreign cor-
porations and corporations engaged in interstate commerce have been up-
held where the burden was slight, in spite of the prohibition in the federal
constitution against the burdening of interstate commerce. Pullman Palace
Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 11 Sup. Ct. 876 (1891); Osborne v
Florida, 164 U. S. 650, 17 Sup. Ct. 214 (1897). The decision in the instant
case is unfortunate in that it may lead to the conclusion that all property of
a federal instrument is exempt from state taxation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTORY STAY OF ACTIOQ ON INSURANC. CON-
TRACTS PAYABLE IN RUSSIAN RUBLES.-The plaintiff, a Russian refugee
residing in France, brought suit on two matured insurance policies issued
in Russia in 1901 and 1906. The defendant, a New York corporation,
moved for a stay of action under a statute [N. Y. Laws (1926) c. 232;
Civ. Prac. Act, § 169-a] which provides that all actions on insurance con-
tracts made before November 7th, 1917, by any American insurance com-
pany, and payable in Russian rubles, or to be performed in Russia, on
application shall be stayed until thirty days following the recognition do
jure of a government of Russia by the United States. As appeared in the
defendant's affidavits, the act was passed to prevent the Soviet govern-
142
RECENT CASE NOTES
ment from collecting on policies issued by American insurance companies
whose Russian assets had been confiscated by it. Held, that the motion
be denied since the statute is unconstitutional, hitcr alia, as impairing the
obligation of contracts. Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 217 App.
Div. 67, 216 N. Y. Supp. 215 (1st Dept. 1926).
Some stay laws have been upheld on the ground that they merely change
the existing remedy without substantially diminishing the value of the
contract. Breitenbacz v. Bush, 44 Pa. 313 (1803); see Bronson v. Kinzie,
1 How. 311, 315 (U. S. 1843); Edwards v,. Kearncy, 96 U. S. 595, C03
(1877). But it is only in the exigency of war or panic that the courts have
sanctioned statutory stays of considerable duration, and then only for a
"reasonable," limited, time. Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. 5230 (La. 1815)
(stay of all civil actions for four months during invasion); Brcitcnbach,
v. Bv2Ih, svpra; Pierrard v. Hoch, 97 Or. 71, 191 Pac. 328 (1920) (stay
of suits against volunteers during three-year enlistment); Chadxicb v.
Moore, 8 Watts & S. 49 (Pa. 1844) (stay of sales on execution for year
during panic). Even in an emergency, an indefinite postponement has
been held void, as in effect denying the remedy. Huds.pcth e. Dadrh 41
Ala. 889 (1867); Luter v. Hunter, 30 Tex. 688 (1868) (stay of execution
or collection of debts until ratification of peace); Clark: v. Martin, 49 Pa.
299 (1865); Granger v. Luther, 42 S. D. 636, 170 N. W. 1019 (1920)
(stay of suits against volunteers for duration of war). Hence, because of
the uncertain duration of the stay in the instant case, and also because the
plaintiff had no connection with the Soviet government, the holding sccms
desirable.
COURTS-FEDERAL EQUITY JURISDIoTION-REFUSAL OF AriraLx CoviTr
TO RurAn SUIT WHEN TERE iS ADEQUATE RcruEY AT LAw.-The plain-
tiffs, out of possession, brought suit to quiet title to certain real etate of
which defendants were in possession under claim of ownership. The plain-
tiffs also asked for the cancellation of a mortgage. The defendant: failed
to object that the remedy at law was adequate. A decree was given for
the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the decree be reverzed since it was
the "duty" of the appellate court, sea sponte, to raise the objection of
lack of equity jurisdiction so as to give effect to U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916)
§ 1244, which provides that "suits in equity shall not be sustained in any
court of the United States in any case where a plain, adequate and com-
plete remedy may be had at law." Denison z,. Keek, 13 Fed. (2d) I84
(C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
A bill to quiet title cannot be maintained in a federal court by a com-
plainant out of possession against a defendant in pozsezsion ao there i3 an
adequate remedy at law. Wlitehead v. Shattffckl, 123 U. S. 1,16, 11 Sup.
Ct. 276 (1891); Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271 (U. S. 1856). Most federal
courts hold that by failing to plead the adequacy of remedy at law season-
ably the defendant waives his power of doing so. Brown v,. Lkef S2?pr
Iron Co., 134 U. S. 530, 10 Sup. Ct. 604 (1S90). Courts in accord with
the instant case base their decision on the fact that the constitutional
guarantee of the right to trial by jury must be preserved. Hipp v. Babin,
supra; Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 466 (U. S. 1874). In these cames, failure
to object should be tantamount to a waiver of the right to trial by jury.
Cobbam nz. Conklin, 208 Fed. 231 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913); see Toledo Conzput-
ing Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 142 Fed. 919, 923 '(C. C. A. 0th,
1906). Another ground relied on the instant case is "the duty of the
court to recognize and preserve as far as it can the constitutional differ-
ence between law and equity actions." There is, however, nothing in the
constitution that requires a distinct p1'rocdr, for law and cquity in the
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federal courts. All that is necessary is that substantive rights, pro-
viously denominated legal or equitable, should be adjudicated. Cf.
Pound (1911) 36 A. B. A. REP. 470; CLARK (1926) 5 Am. LAW Scu.
REV. 716; Phillips v. Gorham, 17 N. Y. 270 (1858) (under a similar
provision of the New York constitution). The greater number of decisions
hold that the appellate court may, in its discretion, omit from its con-
sideration the objection of adequacy of remedy at law when not raised
below. Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354, 9 Sup. Ct. 486 (1889); Hapgood
v. Berry, 157 Fed. 807 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907). In the instant case, the court
might well have exercised its discretion and thus saved itself and the
parties time and expense.
DAMAGES-ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN DEFENDING SUIT BROUGIIT IN
VIOLATION OF INJUNCTION NOT RECOVERABLE.-The plaintiff was granted
an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with certain drill-
ing contracts. Later the defendant brought ejectment against the plain-
tiff, who was awarded judgment. The plaintiff then brought an action for
damages, including attorney's fees paid by him in defense of the eject-
ment action. The lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on
appeal, that the judgment be reversed, even assuming that the defendant
sued in violation of the injunction. Hertzel v. Weber, 246 Pac. 839 (Okla.
1926).
In the absence of statute, attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable
as damages. Oerlichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211 (U. S. 1871); Day v. Wood-
worth, 13 How. 363 (U. S. 1851). In a few states recovery is permitted
by statute. Ga. Civ. Code (1911) § 4392 (if the defendant acted in bad
faith); Wis. Stat. (1921) § 3490 (if the plaintiff sustained actual lois
by the defendant's misconduct). Even in the absence of statute, counsel
fees have frequently been allowed in cases of malicious prosecution and
false imprisonment. Lytton v. Baird, 95 Ind. 349 (1883); Blythe v. Tomp-
kins, 2 Abb. Prac. 468 (N. Y. 1856). Likewise, a grantor is responsible on
his covenant of warranty for attorney's fees expended by the grantee in de.
fending the title. Seitz v. People's Savings Bank, 140 Mich. 106, 103 N. W.
545 (1905); of. New Haven & Northampton Co. v. Hayden, 117 Mass. 433
(1875). In actions for damages for the violation of an injunction, and in
proceedings for civil contempt, attorney's fees have frequently been awarded,
particularly in the federal courts. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale C').,
261 U. S. 399, 43 Sup. Ct. 458 (1923); A. B. Dick Co. v. Fuller, 6 Fed. (2d)
393 (S. D. N. Y. 1923); Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators, 151
Minn. 238, 186 N. W. 787 (1922). Contra: "Oerlichs v. Spain, supra;
People v. Jacobs, 5 Hun, 428 (N. Y. 1875). The main basis for denying
recovery in such cases is the difficulty of ascertaining the fee. See Oerlichs
v. Spain, supra, at 231. But the assessment of damages is certainly no
easier in other situations as, for example, where compensation is allowed
for mental suffering. Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas Co., 158 Calif. 499, 111
Pac. 534 (1910); Young v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 N. C. 370, 11 S. E.
1044 (1890). It has also been urged that the granting of attorney's fees
would prevent much vexatious litigation. MECCARTNEY, PROCEEDINGS, ILL.
STATE BAR Ass'N 419 (1923).
EVIDENCE-GENERAL REPUTATION OF DISORDERLY HOUSE INADMISSIBLE.-
In a prosecution for keeping a disorderly house the state's evidence of the
general reputation of the house was admitted over the defendant's objec-
tion. Held, on appeal, that the defendant's objection be sustained since
there was no "necessity" for an exception to the hearsay rule. State v.
Still, 133 Atl. 778 (Del. 1926).
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Where the offense is keeping a house of "ill fame," some courts hold
that the reputation is "part of the offense," and hence not hearsay.
CadweUl v. State, 17 Conn. 467 (1846); see (1911) 25 HAnv. L. Rrcv. Sr.
Contra: State v. Boardhzan, 64 Me. 523 (1874). Otherwise, where, as in
the instant case, the indictment is for heeping a "disorderly house." Hen-
son v. State, 62 Md. 231 (1S834). Such a technical distinction, however,
seems unwarranted. See State v. Boardzaan, o,.pra, at 529. Generally,
to have an exception to the hearsay rule there must be (1) a guarantee.
of trustworthiness, and (2) some "necessity." 3 Wigmore, EsiJisec
(1923) §§ 1421, 1422. The guarantee of tru.tworthiness, in cases of
general reputation evidence, is the general discussion of the com-
munity as to the truth of the matter asserted. See SoztLWse3t Schleiw
District v. Willia sn, 4S Conn. 504, 507 (1881); Regina v. The Inhabitants;
of Bedfordslhire, 4 E. & B3. 535, 541 (Q. B. 1855). 'Necessit," as intcr-
preted in the instant case, does not exist unless there is an inability of
witnesses, through lack of knowledge, to give direct evidence of the fact.
This view has some support. Wooster v. State, 55 Ala. 217 (1&76); Hen-
son v. State, supra; see Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 209, (1303). This
"necessity," however, was said to be present where general reputation of
insolvency was offered. See Dou'ns v. Richards, 4 Del. Ch. 416, ,25 (1872).
Likewise, where the general reputation of defendant's accomplice as a
kidnapper was offered to show defendant's intent. State r. Hartcn, 4
Har. 532 (Del. 1347). It would seem that the "necessity," as dcfined in
the instant case, would be as great as in the above. 'Most courts in similar
situations admit the evidence because, otherwise, as a practical matter,
the difficulty of proof would approach the impossible; the heeper and
frequenters would not voluntarily testify and they could not ba com-
pelled to do so. Gray v. United States, 266 Fed. 355 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920) ;
Coimionwealth v. Murr, 7 Pa. Super. Ct. 391 (1898). It seems that
"necessity" means simply the practical convenience of admitting the evi-
dence and the value of it. Gf. Anzine v. United States, 260 Fed. 327
(C. C. A. 9th, 1919); Hi.nter v,. Uzited States, 272 Fed. 235 (C. C. L
4th, 1921); 3 Wigmore, Eridcnce (1923) § 1620. Where the evidence is
admitted there must be corroborating evidence to support a conviction.
Howard v. State, 150 Tenn. 341, 265 S. W. 542 (1924); Johnson v. State,
102 Tex. Cr. App. 409, 278 S. W. 210 (1925); Putiaan v. State, 9 Oda.
Cr. 535, 132 Pac. 916 (1913); 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 593, note. But this
does not do away with the "necessity." Many states have statutes admit-
ting the evidence. Iowa Comp. Code (1919) § 1030; Mich. Comp. Laws
(1915) § 7783; 3 Wigmore, Eidence (1923) § 1620, note 7.
INTERNATIONAL IAW-ImMUNITY Fnom RESrONSniITY OF COMMEp.CALm
VESSEL OF FOREIGN GovRNBMNT.-A merchant vessel operated by the
Italian government was libelled by a private suitor for failing to deliver
goods accepted for carriage. The lower court dismissed the libel for want
of jurisdiction on the ground that the vessel was a public ship of a for-
eign government. Held, that the decree be affirmed. The Pesaro, 4G Sup.
Ct. 611 (1926).
The immunity from responsibility of a public vessel of a foreign gov-
ernment is generally recognized. The E:change, 7 Cranch, 116 (U. S.
1812) (warship). No exception is made for public ships engaged in com-
merce. The Parlenzent Beige, 5 P. D. 197 (1880). In some countries (in-
cluding Italy), however, the government may be held responsible for
injuries inflicted by its vessels. U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1923) § 1251!S-a.
For Italian law, see 1 Giaquinto, La Responsabilita degli e-nti Puib-
blici (1912) 145. But immunity from responsibility accorded to foreign
public vessels is founded on a rule of comity between nations. The Parle-
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ment Belge, supra. Courts have recognized that the principle of the instant
case is unsound. See Bank of United States v. Planter's Bank of Georgia,
9 Wheat. 904, 907 (U. S. 1824); The Maipo, 259 Fed. 367, 368 (S. D.
N. Y. 1919); The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473, 481, 482 (S. D. N. Y. 1921). The
Italian courts would probably have assumed jurisdiction, on facts similar
to those of the instant case, over an American public vessel engaged in
commerce. Cf. Gabba (1888) 15 CLUNET, 180; (1889) 16 ibid. 538; (1890)
17 ibid. 27. Contra: cf. Anzilloti (1895) 5 ZTSCHR F. INT. PRIVAT. U.
STRAFRECHT 24, 138. The broad extension of the doctrine of "sovereign im-
munity" has been attacked by writers generally. See Borchard, Govern-
nent Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1; Weston, Actions
against the Property of Sovereigns (1919) 32 HAIv. L. REV. 266; Lord,
Claims in Admiralty Against the Government (1919) 19 COL. L. REv.
467. It not only works hardship on private suitors, but it might also operate
to the government's disadvantage by causing private vessels to refuse to
salvage government merchant vessels. See The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473, 481
(S. D. N. Y. 1921). The rule, however, has apparently become too firmly
entrenched to be uprooted by judicial decision. The adoption of an inter-
national agreement imposing the same responsibility on government and
privately operated merchant vessels seems desirable.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS OVER RESIDENTS
ON FEDEUAL RESERVATIONS.-Maryland sold a tract of land to the federal
government for military purposes, granting to the United States exclusive
jurisdiction over the land, but reserving authority to serve process of
Maryland courts. The plaintiff and defendant, residents on this land,
applied for a divorce in the state court. The bills were dismissed, and the
defendant appealed. Held, (two judges concurring in the result) that the
decree be affirmed, for, since the federal government had exclusive juris-
diction over the reservation, the parties were not residents of the state
for the purpose of securing a divorce in a state court. Lowe v. Lowe,
133 Atl. 729 (Md. 1926).
The Constitution gives the federal government exclusive legislative
power over land and necessary buildings bought with the consent of the
state for military purposes. Art. 1, § 8. Therefore, residents on such land
may not vote. Opinion of the Justices, 42 Mass. 580 (1841); Sinks v.
Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869); In re Town of Highlands, 48 N. Y. St.
Rep. 795, 22 N. Y. Supp. 137 (Sup. Ct. 1892). Likewise, they are exempt
from state taxation and may not enjoy the privileges of state institutions.
Opinion of the Justices, supra; see Fort Leavenworth R. R. v. Lowe, 114
U. S. 525, 537 (1885). When the exclusive jurisdiction over such land is
ceded to the United States, the courts follow the rule of international law
that the former sovereign's municipal law, not inconsistent with the pur-
pose of cession, is continued in force until the new sovereign repeals it.
Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542 (1885) ; Fant v. Arling-
ton Hotel Co., 170 Ark. 440, 280 S. W. 20 (1926) ; Anderson v. Chicago, etc.
Ry., 102 Neb. 578, 168 N. W. 196 (1918). Congressional legislation in this
connection seems to have covered only criminal matters, and not civil per-
sonal relations of residents on such public property. This permits the in-
ference that state courts are to continue to enforce the old state law. See
Divine v. Unaka Nat. Bank, 125 Tenn. 98, 108, 140 S. W. 747, 749 (1911).
Such is the rule in international law. Magoon, The Law of Civil Gov-
ernment under Military Occupation (2d ed. 1902) 30. This seems to be
the practice in regard to the probation of wills and the administration
of estates of residents on federal property. Divine v. Unaka Nat. Bank,
supra; cf. In re Grant's estate, 83 Misc. 257, 144 N. Y. Supp. 567
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(Surr. 1913). Outside of territories and the District of Columbia, Con-
gress has never given federal courts power to probate wills or to grant
divorce; hence, it is doubtful whether they could do so without further
congressional legislation. Rose, Federal Jvrisdiction and Procedure (2d
ed. 1922) §§ 162, 166. Therefore, it would seem more desirable, until Con-
gress provides to the contrary, for the state court to assume jurisdiction
in divorce actions following the custom as regards the probate of wills.
MASTER AND SERVAnT-FELLow-SERvAxT RuLE Noi, APPLICADLm xo
PRoPERmTY-A co-employee negligently permitted his team to collide witn
plaintiff's automobile which the latter was using in the defendant's service.
In an action for damages, the lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff.
Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed since the fellow-servant
rule does not apply to property. Setzkorn, r. City of Buffelo, 126 Micc.
858, 215 N. Y. Supp. 584 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
The fellow-servant doctrine is generally disfavored by commentator-.
(1920) 30 Y, k= LAW JOURNAL, 85; Boyd, The Economic and Lcgal Bai-
of Compulsory Industrial Insurance for Workican (1912) 10 Mien. L. PEv.
345; Labatt, Master and Serrant (1913) § 1393; 1 Shearman & Redfield,
Negligence (6th ed. 1913) 426, 427. Likewise, courts have restrictcd its
application. Koerner v. St. Lozds Car Co., 209 Mo. 141, 107 S. W. 481
(1907) (where fellow servant worked in different department); Fox v.
Packing Co., 96 Mo. App. 173, 70 S. W. 164 (1902) (servant considered
a "vice-principal") ; Beers v. Prouty Co., 200 Mass. 19, 85 N. E. 864- (1903)
(incompetent co-employee); Knoxville News v. Spitzcr, 279 S. W. 1043
(Tenn. 1926) (employing minor unlawfully). Workmen's compensation
statutes abrogate the doctrine in most states, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith,
1921) c. 48, §§ 138, 148; Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 152, § 66. The refusal
to apply the fellow-servant rule in case of property damage anin illu-
trates the present hostility to the doctrine.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--POWER TO PEunziT PRuVATE BwRIDGE Ovr
Sm.rr-Plaintiff sued to obtain a declaratory judgment as to whether
the board of aldermen or other officers of the defendant city had power to
give a landowner the privilege to build and maintain a bridge connecting
its buildings on both sides of a public street owned in fee by plaintiff, and
as to whether a permit was necessary to erect such a bridge. Held, that
the board of aldermen (and no other officers) have such power, so long
as the permit granted is revokable and the bridge does not interfere with
the use of the street, and that the owner does not have the privilege of
maintaining such a bridge without a permit. Yale Univer3ity v. City of
New Haven, 134 Atl. 268 (Conn. 1926).
The legislature has all authority for the regulation of public highways,
but it usually delegates this power to local or state boards. See N.cw Eng-
land Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Boston Terminal Co., 182 Mass. 097, 399, 65 N. B.
835, 836 (1903); World Realty Co. v. City of Oaaha, 113 Neb. 396, 401,
203 N. W. 574, 576 (1925). The legislature, however, may at any time
again exercise this power itself. United R. R. & Canal Co. v. Jercy City,
71 N. J. L. 80, 58 Atl. 71 (1904); see New Evg. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Bo-ton
Terminal Co. supra, at 400, 65 N. E. at 836. Since delegated powers
are usually limited by construction, there is sometimes doubt as to whether
the powers granted to the city to regulate streets include the power to
permit bridges over the streets. rhere the city owns the fee to the
street "in trust for the public" no permit for a private bridge can be
given by the city. Bybee v. State, 94 Ind. 443 (1834). Cf. Field z. Barlinq,
149 fll. 556, 37 N. E. 850 (1894). The city may grant a permit, however,
t
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if the street is owned by the abutting owners and the bridge does not ma-
terially interfere with the public's easement of travel, light and air.
Hendryx Co. v. City of New Haven, 134 Atl. 77 (Conn. 1926). Cf. Kellogg
v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 80 Ohio St. 331, 88 N. E. 882 (1909). Otherwise
where view, light and air are obstructed, since this easement of the abutter
cannot be taken except for public purposes. World Realty Co. v. City of
Omaha, supra; Field v. Barling, supra; Townsend v. Epstein, 93 Md. 537,
49 Atl. 629 (1901). The instant case illustrates the benefits of a Declara-
tory Judgment Act. The legal relations here adjudicated include the
power of a board of aldermen and the privilege of an abutting owner.
As a result no unlawful act has been done, and the judgment will almost
certainly prevent any such act.
PLEADING-JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION-COUNTERCLAIm Fon ASSAULT
AND SLANDER.-In an action for assault, defendant counterclaimed for as-
sault and slander. The plaintiff moved for an order directing the dis-
missal of defendant's counterclaim. Held, that the motion be granted on
the ground that assault and slander are separate causes of action and
may not be joined. Raspaulo v. Ragona, 215 N. Y. Supp. 407 (Sup. Ct.
Spec. T. 1926).
The instant case involves the interpretation of the meaning of the
phrases "cause of action" and "same transaction" which occur in sections
258 (Joinder of Causes of Action) and 266 (Counterclaim) of the N. Y.
Civ. Prac. Act. Occasionally, the New York courts have been quite liberal
in allowing joinder under these sections. Brewer v. Temple, 15 How.
Prac. 286 (N. Y. 1857); Beardsley v. Soper, 184 App. Div. 399, 171 N. Y.
Supp. 1043 (3d Dept. 1918); Ter Kuile v. Marsland, 81 Hun. 420 (N. Y.
1894). Generally, however, they have followed a policy of narrow con-
struction. Anderson v. Hill, 53 Barb. 238 (N. Y. 1869); DeWolfe v.
Abraham, 151 N. Y. 186, 45 N. E. 455 (1896); Adams v. Schwartz, 137
App. Div. 230, 122 N. Y. Supp. 41 (1st Dept. 1910). In many states
which still retain the usual code classification of joinable causes of action,
the restrictions on joinder have been largely removed by a liberal inter-
pretation of the "same transaction" and counterclaim provisions. Craft
Refrigerating Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551, 29 At]. 76
(1893) ; Dinges v. Riggs, 43 Neb. 710, 62 N. W. 74 (1895); Harris v.
Avery, 5 Kan. 146 (1869); Scott v. Waggoner, 48 Mont. 536, 139 Pac. 454
(1914) ; L. R. A. 1916 C., 491, note. Commentators who otherwise differ
considerably in their views on the subject, agree on this point. See Clark,
Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 817; McCaskill, Ac-
tions and Causes of Action (1925) 34 ibid. 614; of. (1925) 34 ibid. 879;
(1925) 35 ibid. 85. Section 258, subdivision 2 (which permits joinder of
actions "for personal injuries, except libel, slander, criminal conversation
or seduction") should not be considered inconsistent with subdivision 9
(the "same transaction" provision), for although the former does not
allow a joinder of assault and slander, it does not prohibit such joinder
under the latter or under the corresponding provision of the counterclaim
section. A few code states have largely removed the restrictions on join-
der by omitting the usual classifications of joinable causes and allowing
comparative freedom of joinder. Iowa Code (1924) § 10960; Kan. Rev.
Stat. (1923) § 60-601; Mich. Comp. Laws (1915) § 12309; N. J. Prac. Act
(1912) § 100; Wis. Stat. (1921) § 2647. The decision in the instant case
is opposed to the desirable tendency of eliminating restrictions on joinder
of actions in both complaints and counterclaims.
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REAL PROPERTY-HUSBAND MA4Y NOT "Fmi uDuLENTLY" DE .FT *WIFVS
DOWER RIGHTS-The plaintiff joined with her husband in a mortgage on
his land to secure his debts. Later, though able to do so, he refused to pay
the debt. At the foreclosure sale his agent bid in the premises, with money
supplied by him. The agent subsequently conveyed, without considera-
tion, to the husband's sister. The wife brought an action to establish her
dower rights on the ground that the transaction was a fraudulent attempt
to defeat her dower. The lower court dismissed the complaint. Held,
on appeal, (two judges dissenting) that the judgment be reserved. Byr ees
v. Owen, 243 N. Y. 211, 153 N. E. 51 (1920).
A husband may not, by the use of a "subterfuge," dispose of his property
so as to bar his wife's dower rights. McClcan v. Dcnwood Realty Co.,
124 M1isc. 283, 207 N. Y. Supp. 226 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (husband procured
third person to buy and foreclose mortgage); Turner v. KMichnic, 70 N. J.
Eq. 61 (1905) (secret agreement between husband mortgagor, and for-
closure purchaser); Douglas v. Douglas, 11 Hun, 406 (N. Y. 1S77) (wife
joined husband in exchange of land; e-xehanged land was conveyed to
husband's sister instead of to himself); Stokcs v. Stokes, 119 Misc. 163,
196 N. Y. Supp. 184 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (wife joined husband in conveyance
to corporation of which husband was the only shareholder). A disposal
of property in contemplation of marriage in order to bar the future wife's
dower has been held to be in "fraud" of the wife. Dhek -e. HzcV Jiew irr,
260 Ill. 131, 102 N. E. 1059 (1913); 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 512, note. But
where the husband later purchased land in the name of a third permn,
the "fraud" theory was not followed. Nichols v. Park, 73 App. Div. 95.
79 N. Y. Supp. 547 (1st Dept. 1903). Other courts have protected the
wife on the ground of a resulting trust. Douglas v. Douglas, smpra. And
in a few states where the wife joins in her husband's mortgage, she is
accorded the rights of a surety. Mowry v. Mowry, 24 R. I. 565, 51 At].
383 (1902). If the court in the instant case had applied the suretyzhip
analogy, the same result would have been reached. The wife's (surety's)
dower rights would not be affected by the act of her husband (the princi-
pal) in purchasing the land at the foreclosure sale. Cf. Va n Hr-ne v.
Everson, 13 Barb. 526 (N. Y. 1852); Madgett v. Fkenor, 90 Ind. 517
(1883). The question is one of policy, and these various thcori¢3 reflect
the courts' desire to protect the wife. Cf. (1923) S CorN. L. Q. 390.
TORTs-ATOMOBILE RCGISTERED IN M.xnm WOMAN's MuDRN N 'Ar-
"NuIsANE" ON THE HIGHWAi.-A Massachusetts statute requires that
a motor vehicle shall be registered in the "name" of its owner. Mass. GEn.
Laws (1921) c. 90, § 2. The plaintiff, a married woman, registered her
automobile in her maiden name, although she usually used her husband's
name. In a collision resulting from the negligence of the defendant's
motorman, the plaintiff was injured and her automobile damaged. In an
action for damages the lower court directed a verdict for the defendant.
Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed, since the plaintiff's auto-
mobile, not being legally registered, was a "nuisance" on the highway.
Bacon v. Boston Elevated Ry., 152 N. E. 35 (Mass. 1926).
While most states have a contrary rule, in Massachusetts an unregic-
tered motor vehicle is a "nuisance" on the highway. Dudicy v. North-
ampton St. Ry., 202 Mass. 44.3, 89 N. E. 25 (1909). Contra: Muller v.
West Jersey & Seashore R. R., 99 N. J. L. 180, 122 Atl. 693 (1923). Simi-
larly, if the automobile is registered in a "name" other than that of the
owner. Love v. Worcester St. Ry., 213 Mass. 137, 99 N. E. 960 (1912)
(registration in the name of the owner's wife); Gould v. Elder, 219 Mrass.
396, 107 N. E. 59 (1914) (registration in the name of a dealer who was
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the agent and employee of the owner); Fairbanks v. Kemp, 226 Mass. 75,
115 N. E. 240 (1917) (registration in the name of the owner's dead hus-
band); Rolli v. Converse, 227 Mass. 162, 116 N. E. 507 (1917) (registra-
tion in the names of two partners, one of whom had retired and trans-
ferred his interest); Hanley v. American Ry. Exp., 244 Mass. 248, 138
N. E. 323 (1923) (registration in the name of an unincorporated asso-
ciation-trade union-of which the owners constituted the local branch).
The statute has been strictly construed because its purpose is to make the
ownership of motor vehicles readily ascertainable. See Bourne v. Whit-
man, 209 Mass. 155, 172, 95 N. E. 404, 408 (1911); Huddy, Automobiles
(7th ed. 1924) 83. Accordingly, the same court has held that registration
is not invalidated by an irregularity which does not conceal the identity
of the owner. Crompton v. Williams, 216 Mass. 184, 103 N. E. 298 (1913)
(registration in a trade name under which the owner did business). Be-
cause of the apparent ease with which the plaintiff in the instant case
was identified, the court might well have held that the requirements of
the statute for registration were satisfied, and thus could have avoided
an unreasonable extension of the much criticized Massachusetts rule.
(1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 394. Moreover, a statute which merely
provides for the resumption of maiden names by divorcecs [Mass. Gen.
Laws (1921) c. 208 § 23] is scant justification for the conclusion that a
married woman must take her husband's name. While she usually does
so, she is impelled by custom rather than by law. (1925) 34 YALU LAW
JOURNAL, 447.
WILLS-PROBATE--JUDGMENT CREDITOR OF DISINHERITED HEIR NOT PRIVI-
LEGED TO CAVEAT WILL.-The complainant secured a judgment against the
heir of the decedent-prior to the latter's death. The judgment debtor
had been excluded from his ancestor's estate by a will which devised the
estate to the debtor's wife. The complainant alleged that the will was
invalid, and filed a caveat to contest its probate. The lower court dis-
missed the caveat. Held, on appeal, that the order be affirmed, since the
judgment creditor had no sufficient interest in the estate of the decedent
to file a caveat. Lee v. Keech, 133 Atl. 835 (Md. 1926).
Universally, either by statute or by court decision, only an "interested
party" may contest a will. Johnston v. Willis, 147 Md. 237, 127 Atl. 862
(1925); Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith, 1921) c. 148, § 7; L. R. A. 1918 A, 447,
note. The courts differ as to the content of the term "interested party."
A general creditor has not a sufficient "interest" to contest the probate of
a will. Shepard's Estate, 170 Pa. 323, 32 Atl. 1040 (1895). Contra:
Brooks v. Paine, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 857, 90 S. W. 600 (1906). Similarly, a
trustee in bankruptcy of an heir at law. In re Beinhauer's Estate, 118
Misc. 527, 193 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Surr. 1922). But the purchaser of the
heir's interest prior to the probate of the will is permitted to do so.
Komorowski v. Jackowski, 164 Wis. 254, 159 N. W. 912 (1916); Savage v.
Bowen, 103 Va. 540, 49 S. E. 668 (1905); see Elmore v. Stevens, 174 Ala.
228, 230, 57 So. 457 (1912). Contra: In re Vanden Bosch's Estate, 207 Mich.
89, 173 N. W. 332 (1919). Moreover, most courts hold that a lionor or
judgment creditor, such as in the instant case, may caveat the will. Smith
v. Bradstreet, 16 Pick. 264 (Mass. 1834); Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo.
333, 48 S. W. 478 (1898) (where judgment creditor had levied execution
on and purchased all the interests of the debtor in the real estate of his
father); In re Langevin's Will, 45 Minn. 429, 47 N. W. 1133 (1891).
Contra: Lockhard v. Stephenson, 120 Ala. 641, 24 So. 996 (1899). The
argument generally advanced by courts in accord with the instant declAon
is that the heir has a "mere expectancy which is without substance and
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utterly beyond the grasp of creditors," hence the latter have no "interest"
in the estate. See Shepard's Estate, supra, at 327, 32 Atl. at 1041 (1895).
The heir has, however, a property interest conditioned upon the will being
invalid. The instant decision fails to indicate on what grounds the will
is sought to be attacked. But as a general holding it may encourage the
exercise of undue influence by the heir upon his ancestor for the purpose
of defrauding the heir's creditors.
WOR= N'S COMIPENSATION-MINOR ILLEGALLY EMPLoED-COmm. 0 LAvW
DEFENSES.-The compensation allowance previously granted to the plain-
tiff was rescinded by the Industrial Compensation Board on the ground
that the plaintiff, being a minor between 14 and 16, and employed without
a certificate in violation of the Child Labor Law at the time of the in-
jury, was illegally employed and so not an "employee" within the Work-
men's Compensation Act. The plaintiff then brought an action at law
against his employer and contended that although he was not entitled to an
award under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the defendant should not
be permitted to set up the common law defenses. The lower court gave
judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be re-
versed. William B. Tilghman Co. v. Conway, 133 Atl. 593 (BMd. 1926).
Workmen's Compensation Acts generally include in their definition of
employees "minors who are legally permitted to work under the laws of
the state." Ill. Rev. Stat. (Hurd, 1919) ch. 48, § 130. Where, however,
relief has been sought under the act, a few courts, under certain circum-
stances, have so strained it as to include minors "illegally" employed.
Wargo v. State's Workmen Insurance Fund, Mackey 184, Worhmen's Comp.
Rep. (C. P. Luzerne Co. Pa. 1920) (because being illegally employed by
a charitable institution, minor could not recover at common law); see Fot.
v. Macomber & Whyte Rope Go., 161 Wis. 549, 551, 154 N. W. 369, 370
(1915) (dictum that minor between 14 and 16 although worlkng without
required certificate could recover under the Act); (1917) 15 Neg. Comp.
Cas. Ann. 720, 723, note. But most courts interpret the Acts to exclude
minors employed in violation of the Child Labor Law. See Lostutter z.
Brown Shoe Co., 203 Ill. App. 517, 522 (1917). And have granted relief in
actions brought at law. Hetzel v. Wasson Piston Ring Co., 39 N. J. L.
201, 98 Atl. 306 (1916); Kruczouski v. Polonia Pub. Co., 203 Mich. 211,
168 N. W. 932 (1918). Even though recovery is allowed at common law,
the minor is not fully protected, for the employer may still, as in the in-
stant case, avail himself of the common law defenses. Where an em-
ployer has failed to insure according to the provisions of the Act, com-
mon law defenses have been abrogated by statute in all but a few states.
1 Schneider, Workmens' Comnpensation Laws (1922) 63. This power
of the legislature is now recognized. Hawkins v. Blcalhy, 243 U. S. 210,
37 Sup. Ct. 255 (1916); Schneider, op. cit. stpra, at '0. How-
ever, no such power seems to have been recognized as residing in the
courts. If, therefore, the repetition of so harsh a decision as the instant
case is to be avoided, legislation specially providing for a minor illegally
employed seems necessary. Cf. Rasi v. Howard, 109 Wash. 524, 1S7 Pac.
327 (1920); Lutz v. Wilwanns Bros. Co., 166 Wis. 210, 164 N. W. 1002
(1917).
